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JN THE SUPREME COURT 
Uf THE STATE UF UTAH 
I , ' l n t l [ f -Ap µe 11 a r1 t , 
vs. 
!1r''ll/C:P & RIU GRANDE WESTERN 
f,'_l\ I LRUAD and STATE OF UTAH 
[1C:PARTMENT UF TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 19019 
This is a personal injury action brought by the plaintiff to 
recover for injuries he received when the truck he was driving 
was struck by a train. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This matter was tried before the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick, of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, sitting without a jury, on November 30 through December 
3, 1982. At the conclusion of the evidence, the court found that 
neither defendant was negligent, and that the sole proximate 
cause of the accident was the negligence of the plaintiff, and 
entered judgment, no cause of action, for the defendants. Find-
,,-,,Jc; nf r'act and Conclusions of Law were prepared by counsel for 
r l«"'l ltuad. Copies of the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of 
Law are attached hereto as Appendix "A". The plaintiff moved to 
the Findings of Fact, and also moved for a new trial. 
I 
I 
Ir 
I 
t 
These motions wert:' den i '"ci t1y t 111..· •11r-1 llr Jlr r j,., •_·r1t• , .. ,I f 'ri 
January 1 3' 1 qs 3. 
11 I 
The plaint it l__ I-' k ,- ,'l:I• ,,, I I l I I 
reversed, and havec l 11 l -.-, ii Ill I' I /ll' N t 1· Lil . 
•1f f·\l']';-; 
The plaintiff-appellant 11; tr.ii, 3ctinn, Austin Hobbs (here: 
after Mr. Hobbs), was a truck <lrivc"r f!Jr \vestern Coal Carriers a· 
the time of the accident which gave rise to this lawsuit. Mr. 
Hobbs had been a truck driver for Western Coal Carriers for 
approximately six years before the time of the accident. (Tr. 
4 71.) During that period he nad received numerous safe driving 
awards from Western Coal Carriers. (Tr. 4 7 5. ) 
On April 6, 1979, representatives of the Department of 
Transportation for the State of (hereinafter Department of 
Transportation), the Denver & Rio Grande Railroad (hereinafter 
Railroad), and the City of Price met together to discuss and rnak; 
plans for the renovation of a railroad crossing located at Carbo1 
Avenue in the city of Price, Utah. (Tr. 19 0. ) The Department o· 
Transportation had prepared the roadway plan for the Carbon 
Avenue crossing. (Tr. 169-70.) A copy of a portion of Exhibit 
P25 is a map of Price City, anrl is attacherl hereto as Appendix 
11 8 11 5 
One of the purposes of the a b1)'1e-rJe>1;1-r rwet was t·J 
determine what should be dune ·wi tr1 the" Ca1·.ri,-m /\venue t rat tic 
(approximately 11,000 vehicles per Jdy I 1'. 251)) during the 
construction of the Carbon Avenue crc1ssi n,3. Several alternative· 
-2-
The railroad proposed that the 
t '' 11,- r,.- ,J,-r,,urc>•1 rr, First West because First West was already 
'' that is, it already had in place flashing 
'• ,,_ ,;,,,Ji,: of the apprcJach of a train. (Tr. 284, 
111• iklJLltt111r_flt ,-Jf Transportation proposed that the traffic 
i• t tci rirst last 1n Price. (Tr. 284.) The first East 
-r,,s-trl•j •iJ•1 not have the crossing safety or warning devices that 
present at either First West or Carbon Avenue. (Tr. 20 3.) 
rhe traffic load at the first East crossing prior to the detour 
,;as approximately 230 vehicles per day. (Tr. 251.) The other 
Jlternat1ve was to move the traffic through the Carbon Avenue 
cr,,ss1nrJ while the construction was in process, without utilizing 
a ,ie tour. (Tr. 19 2. ) 
Department of Transportation had the ultimate and final 
iecis1on with respect to the detour, and decided that the First 
crossing would be used. (Tr. 218-19.) There was some 
discussion with respect to whether additional safety or warning 
devices would be placed at the first East crossing while the 
detour and construction at Carbon Avenue were in process. The 
Department of Transporation again made the final decision that no 
additional safety or warning devices would be placed at the 
cr•Jc;s1ng. (Tr. 219.) The railroad acquiesced in the decision to 
•1et-.:wr the traffic to First East. (Tr. 286.) The Railroad felt, 
f,•Jwever, that a flagman should be present at the First East 
r• ss 1 nrJ dur 1 ny the pen,iency of the detour and, accordingly, one 
-t ,, i•Hied tt1ere. The flagman was not, however, posted at the 
•T"ss1n•J duriny the night but only during the day. (Tr. 341. ) 
-3-
) t .'/ I,] j r1' 
necessary t•J l1a·· t I 
consequently. thcr· 
the presence of a11 clt'[ct 
dent. (Tr. Si:l.) The· rcitlr 'J' c Jt·r 11 intrJ et te(· 
normal 41J m.p.h. down tcJ )lt ''·[·'·"· r Jr. 3 b ·l. I 
A diagram of the First East Cross1nc1 1s set forth in Appenc. 
"Cu. The distance from the bec;innin·d 'Jt the· crossin'g to the 
point of impact, traveliny in the direction that Mr. Hobbs was 
traveling, is approximately 1U6 feet. At the speed of 3 m.p.h. 
(Tr. 488), it would have taken Mr. Hobbs apµroximately 24 seconc' 
to traverse that distance. 
The construction and detour on the Carbon Avenue crossing 
commenced on April 23, 1981. (Tr. 31JO, 318-19.) On that same 
day, Mr. Hobbs was working an atternoon shift driving a coal 
truck for Western Coal Carriers. His work µeriod on the day of 
the accident commenced at apµroximatel1 1:00 p.m. (Tr. 4 7 9. ) 
His work on that day cnns1sted on hauling coal from various mine 
locations to the site locations nf the various coal users who 
utilized the services of Western ()al r'arriers. 
work was confined to eastern ar«1 suut herri "tah. 
Much of this 
(Tr. 112-14. I 
The distance driven by Mr. Horrt)s "" tt,"' •Jay •it the' ·,ns 
approximately 200 miles. (Tr. 116. I 
Mr. Hobbs approachecj the First l·a,,r ca1lroad cr•JSsinCJ wht'fc 
the accident took place at apprnx1rnat,cl·/ lll:Utl P·"'· (Tr. l U7. I 
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•it r,xf11i,Lt P7, ,;h1cr1 is a d1a(Jram of the First East 
Jt t ,-ir r1t:reto as Appendix "C" As Mr. Hobbs 
,,, i'''" t•' cross tt1e tracks he had to go very 
(Tr. 487-88.} 
11,,,• ·f"''"1 '"I, ""h ich Mr. Hobbs was able to cross the railroad 
was only abuut 3 m.p.h. (Tr. 488. ) Mr. Hamilton of the 
ric:;Jartment of Trans[Jortation testified that railroad crossings 
dangerous if they cannot be crossed at a safe speed. (Tr. 
166.) He also testified that a loaded truck should be able to 
cross a crossing at approximately 30 in order to be safe 
and prudent. (Tr. 182.) 
As Mr. Hobbs proceeded across the tracks, any vision that he 
might have had down the tracks was obscured by various objects. 
The objects consisted of a box car parked about 150-300 feet east 
on the side rails at the crossing (Tr. 53, 343), a house, a shed, 
a large tree in foliage, and a car or van. (Tr. 60.) Mr. 
Hobbs could not clearly see up the tracks, because of the obstruc-
tions, until after he was beyond the third set of tracks on the 
railroad crossing. (Tr. 61.) Mr. Hobbs testified that the front 
steering axle was just going across the track when he saw the 
light on the train and heard the whistle. (Tr. 488.} 
Mr. Harvey, who was a supervisor, or road forman of equipment 
tor the railroad, was in the lead engine of the train on the 
"i •1ht of the ace ident for lhe purpose of observing the crew 
111•-.:1r1t JI:-' 1-s. I Tr . SS 'l - b ll • ) Mr. Harvey testified that he first saw 
Mr. Hubbs truck after it had moved past the warning signs, at 
,,ii11ch it was supposed to stop, but didn't. (Tr. 582-84.) He 
-5-
proceeding onto the tracks n"tw1tl1'ot 1nri1 n, i r r J l n ',..',1 
ing, was unusual, t""Je1=- 111 !f'j'l , 1\ 111 r 1 .' \ r 1J1 l l 
see trains on the main 11rw tr'''' 111rt1I 111,, f[f_' ;../.j 
across the crossing. (Tr. 
>IJ) 
'It, ,,1'
1 
I hci l Mt' 
n· I 
Hobbs would stop his truck on th<C cr,)SSltJJ, rJ11t shcn't 0t the ma,, 
line track, and wait for thP train t" p.:iss, notwithstanding he 
would then be directly in the path of any trains which may be 
approaching on any of the other tracks. (Tr. 586-87.) Mr. 
Harve.y did not notify the engineer that Mr. Hobbs' truck was on 
the track until the train was only 150 feet from the point of 
impact. (Tr. 568.) 
Mr. Leonard, the front end brakeman on the train involved it 
the accident, testified that the train was only approximately 50 
feet away from the truck when he first saw it and started taking 
action to stop the train. (Tr. 432.) Mr. Ganser, the engineer, 
had previously seen the truck when the train was about 150 feet 
from the crossing, but took no action other than blowing the 
whistle. (Tr. 405-06, 426.) As described above, Mr. Harvey, whc 
was conducting an observation test of the train crew, saw the 
truck even before Mr. Ganser and observed that he hadn't stopped 
at the crossbucks, but did not attempt to warn the train crew 
until the train was about 150 feet from the crossing. (Tr. 565-
68, 582-88.) It was necessary for Mr. Leonard, the front brake-
man, and Mr. Harvey, an observer in the cab of the train 
to yell to Mr. Ganser, the engineer on the train, in order to 
warn him that the truck was on the tracks. (Tr. 432.) Mr. 
-6-
,,,rh<"t t »,t 1 t 1 1 ·•1 ll1at lhc> consoie in the cab of the engine consti-
1. ' '"• 1r11 1 ·»d1cit ,-,t an •Jbstruct1on of vision to the left for the 
I I ,- • I 
"11 .'Ir. H»t1t1s s.Jw the train he accelerated in an attempt to 
t ht.· '"''' •Jf Ure truck off of the tracks before the train 
(Tr. 489. I The train hit the truck just behind the 
(Tr. 4 9 0. I After the collision, the train proceeded a full 
hlnck west to the Carbon Avenue crossing before it came to a 
stnp. The cab of the truck was impaled on the front of the 
engine from the time of the collision until it came to rest a 
block west of the accident. ( Tr. 4 7- 4 8. ) 
damaqed condition of the cab of Mr. Hobbs' 
Because of the severely 
truck, it took nearly 
an hour for the emergency personnel who arrived on the scene to 
extricate Mr. Hobbs from the truck. (Tr. 48.) 
Officer Douros of the Carbon County Sheriff's office testi-
fied that, after he conducted a full investigation of the 
accident, no citation was issued to Mr. Hobbs with respect to the 
accident. (Tr. 74.) 
Mr. Hobbs was taken to a hospital as soon as he was removed 
trom the truck and he was treated for a fractured pelvis, frac-
tured ribs, and a punctured lung. (Tr. 90.) On September 29, 
1980, Mr. Hobbs underwent back surgery as a consequence of the 
accident. (Tr. 84, 80.) Dr. Robert H. Lamb testified that Mr. 
HoDhs had sustained a 20% permanent partial injury as a result of 
,,,,. a1:c1dent. (Tr. 84.I Mr. Hobbs still suffers from a great 
•1eal of pain and has been substantially limited in his activities 
because of the accident. (Tr. 545-46.) 
-7-
DF:FEl'JDANT UI· NVf.l· " «!• ··I 
,. '1.! ! I ! I \; 
COMP . '\NY iJ.\, ·1 I l i 11 11 i 
RAif.PU,\Ll ·1·· i:r I ! • [11 
MATTER Ur \I '·· 
Utah Code Ann. Sh- 1- l i I I cl ., t ii t I 1 ,_it " 1<-· I ·,:t._'t-i tc.1 I l -
make and maintain good anr1 suff 1c1ent • .-r 1 ss1n 1s at pr,1nts ·,.,!1ereo 
any line of travel crosses 1 ts roa,J." Th'- of what 
constitutes a "good and sutE1c1ent" crossiny was interpreted in 
Denkers v. Southern Pacific Co., 52 Utah 18, 171 P. 999 (19181: 
The court, in a case of this kind, might 
properly charge the JUry in general terms 
that a good and sufficient crossing is a 
crossing that is sutf icient and ordinarily 
safe for the traveling public to pass to and 
fro over it, keeping in mind its location, 
whether in a sparsely settled or populous 
and the character and volume of the 
traffic that ordinarily may be expected to 
pass over it. 
171 P. at 1002. 
In Bridges v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 26 Utah 2d 281, 
488 P.2d 738 (1971), the Utah Supreme Court denied recovery to 
the plaintiffs in a wrongful death action when their nineteen 
year old son was hit by a train, but, in the decision, spelled 
out the tests which must be applied to determine the safety of 
railroad crossings: 
To authorize a Jury to find negligence 
on the part of the railrr)ad in not taking 
additional precautions, there must be evidence 
to indicate that the was more than 
ordinarily hazardous, i.e., there must tJe 
something in the configuration of the land, 
or in the construction of the railroad, or in 
the structures in the vicinity, •)r in tl1e 
nature or amount of the travel on the highway, 
-8-
'Jr in other conditions, 'which renders the 
warning employed at the crossings inadequate 
t<i ·warn lhe puhl ic of dan<Jer. 
j t 7 lK. All the physical surroundings must be evalu-
'1fc'tPrmi11e ·whether a particular crossing is abnormally 
These factors include those mentioned in both the 
1d<JeS and Denkers cases. 
The case of Newman v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 547 
F. 2d 439 (5th Cir. 1977), evaluated the physical conditions of a 
railroad crossing where a train-car collision occurred at night. 
The driver of the car approached the crossing at a speed of 30-
40 m.p.h. and did not stop at a stop sign posted at the 
<'rossing. The train, which was dark in color, was approaching 
the crossing and the train crew was ringing the train's bell and 
blowing its horn. The locomotive's lights were shining as well. 
In addition, a temporary flashing red light had been installed 
over the traffic, although it was not a typical railroad sema-
[Jhore. In finding that the railroad crossing was unsafe and that 
the defendant railroad company had a duty to warn, the court 
said: 
We begin with the principle that failure to 
stop at a railroad as required by law "shall 
not of itself defeat recovery 
Finding that the horn was sound-
ing and the bell was ringing but that the 
plaintiff did not hear them, and assuming 
that the red flashing light was working, the 
district court ruled that these warnings were 
not sufficient under the circumstances. We 
hol,J that under; Mississippi precedent this con-
clusion was not in error. 
545 F.2d at 443 (emphasis added). 
-9-
the railroad as a mitt j j•.\ ''J ,1 t: t I I n f. t :..., l r _' t I • ) r I J/ ,. 
In ruling on this the> t r l J l 11 Jr t '">, i i ( J : II c)'f 1,_ (JU t t l :-: ( )t 
the view and f i n d s th a t ti" 1 L, t 1 JI 1 I t ' s •: 'n 11 u L I t n Ln l i n c; t n s-
or recognize the oncominy train 0r t•i the warniny devices 
that were in operation was the sole cause of the 
accident." In so finding, the court tailed to evaluate the 
crossing in light of its dangerous condition. The following 
evidence was undisputed, and establishes liability as a matter 
law. There were several obstructions to the plaintiff's view 
including a box car, trees and a junk yard. In addition, First 
East was a relatively unused crossing which had suddenly been 
converted into a highway, increasing traffic over it by 48 times 
Visibility was poor because of the darkness, and there were no 
flashing semaphores which Mr. Hobbs was accustomed to seeing. 
flagman had been stationed at the crossing, which Mr. Hobbs 
undoubtedly had seen early in the day, but the flagman had left 
the crossing, and no one was left to warn of an approaching 
train. The crossing to the west which previously handled most rn 
their traffic with flashing warning lights had been deemed to bE 
so hazardous and inadequate that the State and Railroad had 
elected to improve the positioning of the warning lights to 
overhead positions and to install a barrier arm. 
Plaintiff submits that although the court found that the 
crossing was not extra hazardous, it failed to apply the tests 
established in Bridges, supra, and Denkers, supra, to make its 
determination. An application of those tests are as follows: 
-10-
l. !'he ccint tc;ur1t i'Jrl in the land blocked plaintiff Hobbs' 
) t 'j 1 :; 1 ( In• fhl'O c.·onfl,]Uration included foliage from trees 
J''''k ;-H·<i tn fr,Jnt uf the line of sight of a driver. 
L, fhee ,_·,mftcducalion of the railroad tracks was such that 
•he plaintiff had to cross, at a maximum speed of 5 miles per 
hour, a full five sets of ca1lroad tracks prior to safely nego-
tiating the crossing. 
3. Structures in the vicinity included homes, a metal 
shed, a junk yard, a van, and a box car along the side track 
which obstructed the plaintiff's view. 
4. Testimony on the nature and amount of traffic on the 
highway indicated that traffic flows had increased measurably 
from approximately 230 vehicles per day to over 11,000 vehicles 
per day. 
5. The State and Railroad had already determined that the 
same amount of traffic over an improved crossing required flashing 
warning lights and automated barrier arms which lower when trains 
approach. 
6. Other conditions which contributed to the accident 
included the fact that the accident occurred at night and that a 
flagman had been posted at the crossing during the day which 
would give rise to an assumption that someone was protecting 
those ccossing the railroad crossing. In addition, several 
accidents had previously occurred at the intersection which 
ptcJVed its dangerous condition, and also placed the Railroad and 
the State of Utah on notice of the danger. ( R. 162.) 
-11-
Des p i t e the u n con t e s t e c1 f 3 c· t c; p r '·' '" ,, n t ''' 1 ' t t t· L l l '" t1 1 ' • t 1 
proved an extra hazardous cnn1i 1 t l ,, I " 'I l l ,., l r1 
under any one of t ht-? t ] ' ,, ,, l\11 ].1f !,·· ,,,, l f ' ' I ,,, 
in this case st 111 'JUI'' I t L 1 t t IH· '] '-<"31 r1 ··:,,! l II< I \ t ,. I 11 j /._Jr ' 
ous. This finding was cl-car1 1 , __ · 1 1r11 1 .1r-y t' tJ1c> PVl(it::>nC\::' presentt-
and is reversible error. 
f'<llNT I I 
THE RAILROAD WAS NFGLIGFNT IN THE OPERATION 
OF ITS TRAIN. 
It is undisputerl that the engineer did not see and could no1 
see the truck until he was SO to 150 feet from impact. This is 
because the configuration of the cab was such that he could not 
see forward and to the left (Tr. 399), the direction from which 
Hobbs was coming. Ganser was totally dependent upon warnings 
given him from Leonard, the front end brakeman, or Harvey, who 
was sitting in the same seat. Neither said anything to him up tc 
150 feet before impact. 
The Court will take judicial notice, and it was established 
by proof, that at 40 m.p.h. the train is traveling approximately 
60 feet per second. It is also known that there is at least 
second involved for perception and reaction time so that the 
engineer had aproximately a second's notice of the impending 
collision in spite of the fact that the truck in its motion was 
clearly visible by the defendant's calculation and argument for 
24 seconds. 
It is clear that the Railroad had a duty to maintain a 
lookout for approaching automobiles. Alires v. Southern Pacific 
-12-
1_·"·• '73 il.riz. Yi, 370 f.'.2d 'Jl3, 92U-21 (1963). The train fireman 
, ,, t 11.it_ .vt,() wd.s apparently seated on the side of the engine 
nl I 11 ti"· pJcilJ1tltl'S Vei11cle COll1ded, WaS looking the 
11,,_1 ·"·'/ .J11'1 1 11'1 n<lt .-;ee the µla1nt1ff's vehicle approaching. 
:he cuurt neld that this state of facts would justify a jury 
tnstruction un wanton negligence. 
It was clearly negligence for the Railroad in the instant 
to: 
a) Operate a train at any speed which did not afford 
the engineer a clear view to the left and right. 
b) To operate a train at 40 m.p.h. or 30 m.p.h. at 
this location and under these circumstances. 
The trial court's findings that the Railroad was 100% negli-
gence free was contrary to the clear weight of the evidence and 
should be reversed. 
POINT II I 
THE STATE OF UTAH HAD A DUTY TO MAINTAIN A 
SAFE RAILROAD CROSSING. 
The trial court in its decision stated that the State of 
lltah was not negligent and failed to reach the question of whether 
the State was immune from suit under the governmental immunity 
doctrine. Because the issue of governmental immunity was never 
reached, only a general discussion of negligence principles as 
U1ey apply to the State 1s necessary. 
The plaintiff contends that the State was largely respons-
tb1le for the repair work being conducted at the intersection 
where the accident occurred, and that it is subject to the same 
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standard of care as is the Ra1 lrnad. 
Transportation officials m,1'1•c t 11·· 'Nf1•: f ,, 
l' ' ! I 1 fl r-11(_' ',,;J it fl] r1 rj, 
be employed. 
Utah has adopted the phil0snµl1y that .i [><>llt1cal entit1 may be 
held liable for actions or inact1•rns in traffic contrul which 
endanger the public. See Fli•;ielow "· lnyersol, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 
1980); Carroll v. State, 27 Utah 2d 3CJ4, 496 P.2d 888 ( 1972); 
Bramel v. State Road Commission, 24 Utah 2d 50, 465 P.2d 534 
( 1970). The defendant State of Utah had the same responsibility 
as the Railroad to evaluate the condition of the crossing, 
according to the Bridges tests, and to adequately protect the 
crossing where increased traffic would be occurring because of 
its detour. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS AND 
ALLOCATION OF NEGLIGENCE. 
Appeal courts are reluctant to reverse trial decisions on 
factual grounds, and are only willing to do so when the weight of 
the evidence is clearly contrary to the judgment. Hardy v. 
Hendrickson, 27 Utah 2d 251, 495 P.2d 28 (1972). The allocation 
of negligence is also a factual issue. Buttrey Food Stores 
Division v. Coulson, 620 P.2d 549 (Wyo. 1980). 
The trial court or the appeals court may, however, in com[Jar-
ative negligence cases, review the percentage allocations of 
negligence by the finder or fact, and impose its own allocation 
of fault to comform to the evidence at trial. Mazo v. Malone, 
407 A.2d 310 (Me. 1979). In the case of Kinsey v. Kelly, 312 
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'• c•J 4h l r f Li. Ai'I'· 1q·;s1, the plaintiff was driving a motor-
'1 11r1t, ,.;,1'· Jr 1'11n1J in the opposite direction in an 
, ,1 ''""''1 J'.'• ,Jt\•"mµted r.o mdke a left hand turn in front of the 
I' [ ,n r1t 1 ff. fhe pla1nt1tt had seen the defendant pull out into 
thP intersection and stop, and plaintiff thought that the defen-
,Jant was goinrd tu wait for him to pass through the intersec-
t1on. Instead, the defendant turned in front of the motorcycle 
which collided with the defendant's car. At trial the jury found 
that the plaintiff was negligent, and that the defendant was 
oi necJligent. The appeals court reversed the decision by saying: 
The case was tried on comparative negligence. 
By its verdict for the appellee, the jury 
necessarily considered that she was without 
negligence which was a legal cause of the 
accident, and that appellant's negligence was 
100%. 
While the trial and appellate courts are 
not authorized to substitute their judgment 
for that of the jury on disputed questions of 
fact, a new trial should be granted when the 
verdict is against the manifest weight of the 
evidence. Here, the record clearly shows at 
least some degree of negligence on the part 
of the appellee. We therefore, find that 
this verdict was against the manifest weight 
of the evidence and that the trial judge 
abused his discretion in denying appellant's 
motion for a new trial. 
312 So.2d at 462 (emphasis added). 
This case is similar to the Kinsey case in that, viewing the 
undisputed facts presented at trial, as a matter of law there was 
lecest some derJcee of neyl1gence on the part of defendant Denver 
R10 Grande Western Railroad and the State of Utah. The increased 
tcattic, the obstructions to view, the absence of the flagman, 
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1 1 rr1,_, 1 , it 1 t 1 J f • f i ' n r 1 -i r i t 
The allocation under- -,·m1pat Llt 1 ;'- r1\ 1 i ;• 11'--'' r 1 ! J 1111 11• 1l1 jt--'[11 
the plaintiff and O'.\ ne,Jl 1 J''r'' 
against the weight of the evidenccc. 
Another case where the rev1ewiny court reversed on the 
percent allocation of negligence is Lawver v. City of Park Falls, 
35 Wis. 2d 308, 151 N.W.2d 68 ( 1967). In Lawver, the plaintiff 
was forced to walk as a pedestrian in the snow covered streets 
because Park Falls City had failed to plow the side 
walks. While walking on the street, the plaintiff stepped on a 
large piece of ice, and fell, injuring her ankle. The plaintiff 
brought a negligence action against the City, and the jury found 
that she was 75% negligent, the City 25% negligent, and she was 
denied any recovery under the Wisconsin comparative negligence 
statute. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the case based 
on the erroneous allocation by the jury, and said: 
There is no question the City was negligent 
in not plowing or shoveling the snow on the 
north sidewalk, but we cannot agree with the 
plaintiff's contentions that she could not be 
negligent in her manner of walking or in her 
position in the street because she was forced 
to walk there. 
However, the apportionment of negligence 
is such that it cannot be sustained. We 
think as a matter of law that 75% causal 
negligence attributable to a pedestrian 
forced to walk in the public street ann who 
stumbles over ice ruts is unreasonably dispro-
portionate to the negligence of the City in 
failing to keep its sidewalks shovelled. 
Here we think the apportionment of 
negligence cannot be sustainen either on the 
evidence or as a matter of law. While it can 
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'"-' '"rJu>_·•J tr1cit puhlic sidewalks in small 
t >wn' i ri the fdr north which are subject to 
tr' snow fcills and little pedestrian 
r r 1 t ti,· cd11n0t tie kept as clean of snow as 
ll/ streets in a metropolitan city in southern 
'<H s ·' 'n '-' l n , n eve r the 1 es s , a C i t y does have the 
d1Jt '/ to keep 1 ts sidewalks reasonably safe 
urider all the conditions for pedestrian 
traftic. 
N.W. at 7U. 
There ts no question that the Railroad and the State had a 
duty to make the railroad crossing safe. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 56-1-11 (1974). The factual circumstances discussed above 
prove that the failure of the defendants to remedy certain condi-
tions was a breach of their duty of care. In Lawver, the plain-
tiff had a duty to look and did not see the obstructions that 
caused her fall. This duty, however, did not preclude her from 
recovering or make her action completely negligent, nor did it 
even sustain a negligent allocation of 75% to her and 25% to the 
defendant City. 
In the instant case, the plaintiff had a duty to stop, look 
and listen. Some negligence on plaintiff Hobbs' part, however, 
does not conclusively establish a bar to his recovery. The very 
purpose of comparative negligence was to prevent the harsh 
results of the contributory negligence doctrine which denied a 
plaintiff recovery when fault ought to be fairly allocated among 
the rart ies. Rigtrup v. Strawberry Water Users Association, 563 
P.?d 1247 (Utah 1977). In this case, despite undisputed fault by 
rh,.. de[ce11dants, the tinder of fact failed to allocate fault among 
the parties but simply determined that because plaintiff Hobbs 
•l1d nut see the trian, his own negligence was the sole proximate 
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cause of the accident and his ""n 111J •Jr l <"'". 
I n a w r f u 1 cl e, 1 t h .::i., · t t 1 1 r 1 ,\ 1 t 1 1 ' I 1:111 I I( I I 
case, Scovill v. M1s·;,•u1 1 'I ( -'t 11 l 1 l. I' 
people were killed in a "11 - t' "' 1 1_ l I j l It 
I •l x t'-='n-
sively used, cit iny tra It ic <>t l, 1 ,,, clll•.! 17 trains •iaily. 
The crossing was only tiy sLit1•lcJrd crossbucks and a re" 
stop sign. The driver of the car .3t•)ppe11 t)ef•)re reaching the 
first track, but the cross1 nq had multiµle tracks and he did not 
stop for each track. several sight obstructions and the angle 
the sun blocked the driver's visiori, and his car was struck by 
the defendant's train while he attempted to cross the tracks. 
At trial there was disputed evidence as to whether the 
defendant's train was sounding the required warnings. The plain-
tiffs also contended that the crossing was extra hazardous based 
on the inadequacy of the warninys and the obstructions to the 
driver's view. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff an: 
the defendant appealed. 
On appeal, the defendant argued that because the Arkansas 
statute required a stop between fifteen and fifty feet before a 
railroad track, that the plaintiff was negligent per se. The 
appeals court rejected this argument: 
A significant facet of this argument is that 
Thomas approached the crossiny charged, under 
§ 75-637, n. 3 supra, with the duty of brinq-
ing his automobTieto a stop within fifty 
feet and not less than fifteen feet ot the 
nearest ra i 1. We already have observed that 
this statutory duty does not become appli-
cable unless the emits an audible 
signal from a distance cf not less than 
fifteen hundred feet ot the crossiny, or 
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ur>lc·ss U1e train is plainly visible. In 
111'-'.V ()ft-lit-:" ,_·rJntrr)versy on thE::- signal issue, 
.-Jrid [Ji-_·c,111St-.: a v1()lat1r"Jn of the statute can 
_5' 1-me 1:·1 idence of negligence, 
, (_' , f ') c e x a rn 1) l , 8 u s s e l l v . M i s sou r i 
I·1•lt11. f<.J1lr•1all Co., 237 Ark. 812 376 
I 1964 I, we are unable to 
view the statue as one having dispositive 
significance. 
<l'>M r.2rl at 646 n. 15 (emphasis adrled). 
The Arkansas statute is very similar to the statute in Utah 
requiring the plaintiff to stop between 15 to 50 feet from a 
railroad track. Any negligence by the plaintiff Hobbs of not 
stopping, or failing to see the train, is not conclusive as to 
his negligence. All other needed to be considered, 
including those factors already cited which would contribute to 
the extra hazardous condition of the railroad crossing. 
In this case, instead of evaluating the circumstances, the 
findings of fact are devoid of any factual finding other than a 
statement that the plaintiff had clear vision towards the train 
during a short period of time that the intersection was safe. 
There was no finding as to the increase in traffic, the specific 
sight obstructions, the color of the train, or the flagman who 
had previously been employed, etc. Yet the court held that the 
crossing was not hazardous as a matter of law. This was clearly 
an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court and warrants 
d reversal. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Austin Hubbs was struck by a train at the First East 
The trial court determined that the Railroad 
ctfl11 the State were absolutely without fault with respect to the 
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accident, and that the sole caus<-' •)f th,_- 3,_,,-1 
gence of Mr. Hohbs. The r-ri,11 1 1 l1rt ' 1 t t • I .•. 11 
erroneous. The ,_.l!?dt-l·, 
railroad crossin9 this v11-lt: !icL'- tr l'. f"l 
m.p.h. even by heavy trucks. Tht:' F 1 r::;t r'a::JL CL<JSS l rlj ':J-.:1S S 1 J 
rough that the maximum speed for a l<!a<J,,,1 t1-uck -was al'[Jroxirnate 
5 m.p.h. Numerous objects blocked 'Ir. Hnbbs' view. 
The appellant acknowledges that there were times when 
Hobbs was between obstructions and perhaps could have seen the 
engine lights on the train had he been looking in that directi0 
at that time; however, Mr. Hobbs obviously did not know from 
which direction a train might be coming, and he was required to 
look in numerous other directions during the 24 seconds he was 
crossing the tracks. Because of the dark color of the train, 
only the engine lights would have been visible. The opportunit: 
to catch a brief glimpse of the engine of the train if one 
to be looking in the right direction is simply not enough, as a 
matter of law, to absolve the Railroad and the State from lia-
bility for failure to remove the obstructions from the crossing 
or to install lights or other devices which would warn persons '. 
an approaching train. 
The evidence also clearly established that the Railroad wa! 
negligent, and the trial court's ruling to the contrary was 
against the clear weight of the evidence. The evidence showe-1 
that some of the train personnel were aware of the truck suh-
stantially before the collision, but failed to take any action r 
prevent a collision. In addition, the design of the train enyir 
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'r1J .-:; uc J 1 t t_ I ni-_, 'J l :i l r_ir1 1 ;f the enl'.d 1 neer was ob st r-ucted so that 
,,, t_ 1·;,, J ,, rJf a[Jproaching vehicles, and he 
baserl upon the foreyo1nq, the appellant respectfully requests 
that the rlecision of the trial court be reversed, and the case 
for a new trial. 
DATED day of August, 1983. 
HOWARD, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
MAILED two copies of the foregoing to Mr. E. Scott Savage, 
Esq., 50 South Main Street, Suite 1600, P.O. Box 3400, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84110, and to Mr. Stuart L. Poelman, Esq., P.O. Box 
3000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110, postage prepaid, this ;8fr.--day 
of August, 1983. 
SECRETARY 
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CORNWALL McCARTHY ,-.l,. _ \ {l _ 
for Defendant The Denver & Rio 
Grande Western Railroad Company 
SO Suutlt Main Street, Suite 1600 
SHlt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Teleehone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
AUSTIN HOBBS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE DENVER RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY; and 
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENf 
OF 7RANSPOR7A'l'ICll<, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
COtlCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No, C-80-5688 
On November 30 through December 3, 1982, this matter 
was tried before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick of the above- 1 
entitled Court, sitting without a jury. Jackson B. Howard 
represented Plaintiff. Alan L. Sullivan and Jeffrey E. Nelson 
represented defendant The Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad 
Company (the "Railroad11 ). Stuart L. Poelman represented defen-
dant State of Utah, Department of Transportation (the "DOT"). 
Plaintiff called the following witnesses to testify on 
his behalf: Steven Douros, Dr. Robert Lamb, Reese Blackhurst, 
Archie Hamilton, Gerald Leonard, Martin Ganser, Austin Hobbs, 
and Betty Hobbs. Plaintiff also read into the record all or 
part ,)f tt1e depositions of Arland Esklund, Chad Chesnut, John 
Cule, and Dwayne Russell. The Railroad called James Harvey, 
Cameron E. Ha.1J.".l'""'''· Ht:"d r 11 
ses on 
In addition to lhe tPst1m.1n, ,1f the i..'i! numerous exhi-
bits were introduced into 
On the bas Ls t!ie te..,;t imonv and evidence adduced at 
trial, the Court makes the following findings of fact: 
FINDINGS _OF FACT 
1. At about 10:00 r.m. on April 23, 1979, while 
driving a coal-hauling tractor-trailer truck in connection with 
his employment, Plaintiff was involved in a collision with one 
of the Railroad's trains at the Railroad's crossing located 
between Second and Third South on First East in Price, Utah. 
2. The First East crossing is composed of five sets 
of tracks. The northernmost of these tracks is the active or 
"mainline11 track. It was on this track that the collision 
occurred. The tracks approach First East from a slightly east-
southeasterly direction. The mainline track is straight for 
more than three-quarters of a mile to the east of the First 
East crossing. 
3. The Railroad's tracks also cross Carbon Avenue in 
Price. On the day of the accident, the Carbon Avenue crossing 
was closed because of repair work being performed there at the 
direction of the DOT. The DOT detoured traffic from Carbon 
Avenue to First East to permit Railroad and DOT crews to com-
plete the work, which was to take about three to five days. 
4. The DOT made the decision to detour traffic from 
Carbon Avenue to First East. The decision was made after a 
meeting called by the DOT on April 6, 1979, attended by repre-
sentatives of the DOT, the Railroad, and Price City. At the 
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meeting, it was determined that it would be impractical to 
rermit traffic to continue across the Carbon Avenue crossing 
tt1e construction. Another alternative considered at the 
meeting was that traffic be diverted to First West. However, 
the DO':' decided to detour traffic to First East for several 
reasons, including, but not limited to, the following: (1) 
there was less existing traffic on First East than on First 
West; (2) the housing and population of children were less 
dense on First East; (3) the turns along the First East detour 
route were easier to negotiate, particularly for large coal 
trucks; and (4) the First East crossing was in better condition 
and could more easily accommodate the additional traffic, in-
cluding the large coal trucks. The chosen detour diverted 
traffic traveling northbound on Carbon Avenue right (east) on 
Third South, left (north) on First East across the tracks to 
First South, left (west) on First South, then right (north) on 
Carbon Avenue. 
5. Before the construction began, the warning sig-
nals at the First East crossing consisted of white 11 crossbuck11 
signs that had been there for many years. The DOT installed 
additional yellow railroad warning signs before the detour was 
imposed. The Railroad imposed a "slow order" during the con-
struction, requiring its trains to reduce their speed from 40 
m.p.h. to 30 m.p.h. from milepost 619.0 to 619.5 during the 
period of the construction. Milepost 619.0 was located about 
100 feet east of the First East crossing, and milepost 619.5 
was located one-half mile west of milepost 619.0. 
6. The train crew in the lead engine on the night of 
the accident consisted of the engineer (Martin Ganser), the 
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head brakeman ,, ; L:•L r,1,1 t 1t1'mu:1 ,if 
ment (James Har.ievl. Mr. H,in . ..:\'.., dulie::-, inc.:luded the super-
vision anJ Jf tl1e crews, and he was 
seated in the lead englne on tt1P night uf the accident for the 
purpose, among others, of observing and evaluating the crew's 
performance. 
7. As the train approached Price on the night of the 
accident, the train engineer reduced the speed of the train 
from approximately 60 m.p.h. to 40 m.p.h. or less in accordance 
with the applicable Price City ordinance. The train engineer 
further reduced the speed of the train to 30 m.p.h. or less at 
milepost 619.0 in accordance with the Railroad's slow order. 
8. As the Railroad's train approached to within a 
quarter mile of the First East crossing, its locomotive bell 
was ringing, the fixed and oscillating headlights on the front 
of its locomotive were burning, and the train engineer sounded 
the standard whistle signal, composed of two long blasts fol-
lowed by one short blast and one long blast. 
9. On the night of the accident, Plaintiff drove 
north on Carbon Avenue, then followed the detour route that led 
him east on Third South, then north on First East. Plaintiff 
knew that the northernmost track was the mainline track and he 
was acquainted with the First East crossing because he crossed 
it traveling south earlier on the day of the accident. Fur-
thermore, Plaintiff had crossed the Carbon Avenue crossing 
frequently during the six years he had worked for his employer 
before the accident. 
10. As Plaintiff appcoacheJ tl1e First East crossing, 
he slowed his truck to approximately 3 to 5 m.p.h., but failed 
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tr c JCJv ,i C·)mplet<-' stop at any point before or on the cros-
sing Plaintiff had a clear view of the approaching train for 
ar [e,-,1st t'1e last 110 feet before he reached the mainline 
track, except for a very brief period when his view of the lead 
engine was obstructed by a stationary boxcar parked approxi-
mately 140 feet east of the crossing on a storage track. After 
passing that obstruction, Plaintiff had a clear view of the 
approaching train for more than 10 seconds before he reached 
the mainline track and with ample time to bring his truck to a 
stop. Plaintiff proceeded across the crossing at approximately 
3 to 5 m.p.h. and either failed to look or listen for the train 
or failed to heed what he saw or heard as the train approached. 
11. James Harvey, who was sitting in the left front 
seat of the train engine cab, saw Plaintiff's truck approaching 
the crossing but assumed that, because the truck was deceler-
ating and approaching the crossing so slowly, Plaintiff 
intended to stop. Gerald Leonard, seated behind Mr, Harvey, 
also saw Plaintiff's truck approaching the mainline track. 
When Mr. Harvey and Mr. Leonard realized that the truck was not 
going to stop before the mainline track, they simultaneously 
warned Martin Ganser. At that time, the train could not be 
stopped short of the crossing. Mr. Ganser saw the truck and 
immediately applied the train's emergency brakes. 
On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, the 
Court makes the following conclusions of law: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Railroad 1 s crew members exercised reasonable 
c8.re and were not negligent in the operation of the train on 
night of the accident. The Railroad was not negligent with 
respect to the design of the cab in its locomotive. 
-5-
Code Ann. 56-1-14 (Supp. 191::\1) by s11unrling the train'b ----
whistle and bell continu,)usly fvr at ledst 80 rud'.:. (d quarter 
mile) before crossing the First East crossing. 
3. The Railroad exercised reasu11able care in CTain-
taining the First East crossing. 
4. The DOT exercised reasonable care in the choice 
of the detour route to First East and in the choice of crossing 
protections required and installed at the First East crossing. 
5. The First East crossing was not an extrahazardous 
crossing either because of volume of traffic, or the nature of 
the First East crossing, or the presence of buildings or other 
obstructions, or because of the circumstances prevailing on the 
night of the accident. Therefore, neither the DOT nor the 
Railroad had a duty to place flagmen or additional warnings or 
protections at the First East crossing. 
6. Plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable care in 
approaching and crossing the First East crossing. Plaintiff's 
failure to see or hear what a reasonable person could have seen 
or heard, or to heed what he saw or heard, constituted negli-
gence per se. Plaintiff's negligence was the sole proximate 
cause of Plaintiff's accident and injuries. 
7. Plaintiff failed to comply with Utah Code Ann. 
41-6-95(a) (1981) because he failed to stop within 50 feet 
but not less than 10 feet from the First East crossing when the 
Railroad's train was approaching within approximately 1,500 
feet of the crossing and emitting an audible signal, and when 
the train, because of its speed and nearness to the First East 
crossing, constituted an immediate and because the 
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Kailrt1d1J's train was plainly visible and was in 
hdzdrdous proximity to the First 
DATED this _;J.jliray of , 1982. 
Approved as to form: 
Jackson B. Howard 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
BY THE COURT: 
Attorney for Defendant State of Utah, 
Department of Transportation 
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